INDIAN FEUDALISM

                           INTRODUCTION 

“Feudalism  Made  Land  The   Measure  And  The  Master  Of  All  Things”

                                                                                                              _Lord  Acton.

Oxford  Dictionary  defines  Feudalism  as,  ‘The  social  system  in  medieval  Europe  in  which  people  worked  and  fought  for  a  lord  in  return  for  a  land.  Many  institutions  that  developed  in  Early  Medieval  India  kept  the  peasants  under  control. As  a  mode  of  production,  feudalism  has  a  dominant  class  of  landlords  who  are  not  directly  engaged  in  production.  Production  is  carried  on  by   peasants  who  occupy  land  and  work  on  it.  But  the  landed  interest  extracts  surplus  product  and  labour  from  them  by  legal,  military,  ideological  and  other  extra-economic  means.   R.  S.  Sharma  dates  the  Early  Medieval   Indian   period  from  300 CE -1200 CE.  In  this  assignment  I  will  try  to  point  out  some  of  the  important  debates  on  Early  Medieval  Indian  Feudalism  by  historians  like  R. S. Sharma,  Harbans  Mukhia  and  many  others  famous  historians.

THE  DEBATE

Several  scholars  have  questioned  the  use  of  the  term  ‘feudalism’  to  characterize  the  early  medieval  socio-economic  formation  in  India.  According  to  Harbans  Mukia,  unlike  capitalism,  feudalism  is  not  a  universal  phenomenon. Marx  stated  that  feudalism  assumes  different  aspects  and  runs  through  its  various  phases    in  different  orders  of  succession.  But  certain  characteristics  remain  the  same.  This  is  admitted  even  by  the  critics  of  Indian  feudalism.  Feudalism  has  to  be  seen  as  a  mechanism  for  the  distribution  of  the  means  of  production  and  for  appropriation  of  surplus.  Harbans  Mukhia  argues  that  the   peasant  in  medieval  India  enjoyed  autonomy  of production  because  he  had  ‘complete  control’  over  the  means  of  production.   R.  S.  Sharma  talks  against  this  argument  by  explaining  the  problem  of  the  distribution  of  the  resources  of  production  in  early  medieval  India.  Land  was  the  primary  means  of  production.  It  should  be  made  clear  that  in  early  medieval  times,  in  the  same  piece  of  land,  the  peasants  held  inferior  rights  and  the  landlords  held  superior  rights.  Peasants  may  have  possessed  land,  labour,  oxen,  and  other  animals  and  agricultural  implements.  But  the  peasants  were  not  given  effective  control  over  the  means  of  production. The  beneficiary  was  entitled  to  collect  taxes,  all  kinds  of  income,  all  kinds  of  occasional  taxes,  and  this  all  (sarva) was  never  specified.  Since  the  peasant  did  not  have  free  access  to  various  agrarian  resources  his  autonomy  in  production  was  substantially  crippled.  Plough  agriculture  depended  entirely  on  the  use  of  cattle.  What  a  peasant  possessed  was  not  sufficient  to  feed  the  cattle.  Hierarchical  control  over  land  was  created  by  large-scale  subinfeudation,  especially  from  the  eighth  century  onwards.  It  consisted  of  the  king  on  top  followed  by  the  assignee  and  the  occupant  who  leased  land  to  the  sub-occupant  who  finally  got  it  tilled  by  the  cultivating  tenant.   According  to  Marx,  ‘feudal  production  is  characterized  by  division  of  soil  amongst  the greatest possible  number  of  sub-feudatories’. The  peasantry  was  divested  more  and  more  of  its  homogeneous  and  egalitarian  character.  Many  indications  of  unequal  distribution  of  land  in  the  village  are  available.  We  hear  not  only  of  brahmanas  but  also  of  the  chief  brahmana,  mahattama,  uttama,  krsivala,  karsaka,  ksetrakara,  kutumbin  and  karuka,  land  endowed  brahmanas  and  agraharas.  Some  provisions  clearly  created  the  superior  rights  of  the  beneficiary  in  the  land.  The  Gupta  and  post-Gupta  charters  of  Madhya  Pradesh,  Northern  Maharashtra,   Konkan  and  Gujarat  empower  the  beneficiary  to  evict  old  peasants  and  introduce  new  ones;  he  could  also  assign   lands  to  others.  A  similar  provision  occurs  in  later  Cola  charters. In  any  case,  all  such  privileges  create  for  the  beneficiary  superior  rights  in  the  land.  So  R. S.  Sharma  says  that  we  have  no  means  of  establishing  that  most  of  the  peasants  living  in  villages  were  in  ‘complete  control’  of  the  means  of  production.

 

                                      R.S.  Sharma  speaks  of  the  absence  of  extraneous  control  over  the  peasants’  process  of  production  at  all  levels  of  stratified  rural  society  (with  all  the  qualifications  that  have  been  suggested)  led  them  to  participate  in  the  ‘great  agrarian  expansion’.  However,  starting  with  unequal  resources, Harbans  Mukhia  states  that   different  strata  of  agriculturalists  would  benefit  differently  from  this  expansion,  so  that  the  very  process  of  agricultural  progress  would  further  promote  stratification  and  generate  new  forms  of  rural  tension.  In  a  regional  study,  though  of  a  much  later  period,  the  whole  spectrum  of  such  tensions  has  been  brought  alive  and  it  has  been shown  that  disputes  were  not  only  economic  in  nature  (Bajekal,  1980);  quite  possibly  the  nature  of  tensions  would  vary  over  time  and  space  but,  equally  possibly,  with  growing  stratification  and  widespread  agricultural  progress,  tensions  would  arise  at  a  number  of  joints  in  that  society.

                                               The  most  crucial  element  of  the  Indian  feudalism,  in  Professor  Sharma’s  and  Professor  Yadava’s  view,  consisted  in  the  growing  dependence  of  the  peasantry  on  the  landed  intermediaries  following  the  grant  of  more  and  more  rights  to  them by  the  state.  The  dependence  was  manifested  in  terms  of  increasing  restrictions  on  the  peasant’s  mobility  and  his  subjection  to  forced  labour,  which  in  turn  was  becoming  increasingly  intensive.  R.  S.  Sharma  and   B. N.  S.  Yadava  have  established  considerable  similarity  in  the  features  of  Indian  and  European feudalism,  the  one  basic  difference  was  overlooked  by  them.  European  feudalism  developed  essentially  as  changes  at  the  base  of  society  took  place;  in  India,  on  the  other  hand,  the  establishment  of  feudalism  is  attributed  by  its  protagonists  primarily  to  state  action  in  granting  land  in lieu  of  salary  or  in  charity  and  the  action  of  the  grantees  in  subjecting  the  peasantry  by  means  of  legal  rights  assigned  to  them  by  the  state.  It  is  a  moot  point  whether   such  complex  social  structures  can  be  established  through  administrative  and  legal  procedures.

                                                           Above  all,  however,  it  is  the  concept  of  the  peasantry’s  ‘dependence’  that  appears  to  be  of  uncertain  value  in  the  context  in  which  it  has  been  used.  The  evidence  marshaled  by  Sharma  and  Yadava  at  best  establishes  the  increasing  exploitation  of  the  peasantry;  dependence,  on  the  other  hand,  should  consist  of  an  extraneous  over  the  peasant’s  process  of  production,  and  this  has  yet  to  be  proved  in  Indian  context.  The  nature  of  Forced  Labour  in  India _  of   which  there  is  considerable  evidence  throughout  her  history_  is  its  very  essence  different  from  that  of  Europe,  for  in  India  it  is  very  rarely  used  for  purposes  of  production.  There  is  an  objective    reason  for  the  absence  of  serfdom  in  Indian  history,  for  conditions  of  production  in  India  did  not  require  serf-labour.  Thus  forced  labour  in  India  remained,  by  and  large,  an  incidental  manifestation  of  the  political  and  administrative  power  of the  ruling  class  rather  than  a  part  of  the  process  of  production. 

Hrabans  Mukhia  states  that  the  utilization  of  the  labour  of  menial  castes  in  it  fields  by  the  entire  community  of  cultivators  irrespective  of  its  own  stratification.  Their  labour  was  made  available  by  denying  them  access  to  land,  even  in  the  context  of  land  abundance,  through  the  working  of  the  caste  system  (Habib,  1963:  121-2;  1982:  14,  18).  It  is  tempting  to  attribute  the  growth  of  this  class  of  ‘an  ostracized  rural  proletariat’  as  Irfan  Habib  calls  it,  to  the  proliferation  of  untouchable  castes  in  ancient  and  early  medieval  India.  It  is  curious  however  that  growth  in  the  number  of  untouchable  castes  in  ancient  and  early  medieval  India  notwithstanding_  a  theme  on  which  Vivekanand  Jha  has  done  such  impressive  research  (1975:  14-31)_ no  contemporary  evidence  has  yet  been  cited  to  the  effect  that  the  caste  system  (or  the  state)  denied  them  the  right  to  hold  land.  The  history  of  this,  one  of  the  most significant  developments  in  India’s  past,  which  is  also  a  feature  specific  to  Indian  society,  is  therefore  far  from  clear  even  in  outline.

                                                                    Harbans  Mukhia  claims  that  because  soil  in  India  was  very  fertile  there  was  no  scope  for  the  rise  of  serfdom  or  forced  labour. Against  this,  R.  S.  Sharma  argues  that  we   have  indications  of  forced  labour  in  the  middle  Gangetic  basin  where  the  soil  is  most  fertile.  Till  recent  times  poor  tenants,  belonging  to  the  lower  castes,  were  forced  by    the  upper  class  landlords  to  work  in  the  fields  at  meagre  wages. Peasants  were  compelled  to  plough  the  land  of  the  landlords  and  do  various  kinds  of  odd  jobs  for  them  in  other  fertile  areas.  This  is  known   as  hari  and  begari  in  the  whole  of  the  Gangetic  basin  area.  This  means  that  the  peasants   were  subjected  to  forced  labour  and  oppression.  Harbans  Mukhia  goes  against  R.  S.  Sharma’s  explanation  and  says  that  the  relatively  small  size  of  holdings  in  India  had  the  principal  effect  of  averting  wastage  of  labour  in  the  process  of  production,  consequently  far  lass  labour  was  required  for  the  agricultural  operations  here.  Moreover,  these  operations  could  be  spread  over  a  much  longer  period  in  the  course  of  the  year  than  in  Western  Europe.  Thus  there  does   not  appear  to  have  been  a  highly  concentrated  demand  for  large  amounts  of  labour  during  short  periods. It  is  thus  that  the  absence  of  serfdom  in  Indian  history,  except  for  some  marginal  incidence,  becomes  intelligible.

                                                               R.  S.   Sharma  criticizes  Burton  Stein  who  considered  reputed  historians  like  Devangana Desai,  Lallanji  Gopal,  N.  Karashima,  T.  V.  Mahalingam,  Dasharatha  Sharma,  Niharranjan  Ray  and  B.  N.  S.  Yadava  as  leftists.  These  so  called    ‘leftists’  (which  Sharma  disagrees)  have  applied  feudal  analogy  fully  or  partly  to  the Indian  state  and  society  of  different  regions  and  periods.  Niharranjan  Ray  states:  ‘From  the  time  of  the  Guptas  to  the  end  of  the  ancient  period  (12^th  century)  the  political  and  social  structures  of  Bengal  and  for  that  matter  all  of  India,  was  essentially  feudal…’  However,  the  declamation  of  the  feudal  concept  in  the  Indian  context  has  become  an  obsession  with  some  western  historians.  Some  historians  of  the  West  and  Indologists  underline  the  role  of  decentralization  in  early  Indian  history  and  assert  that  the  Indian  rulers  were  merely  masters  of   roads,  towns  and  capitals  and  not  of  hinterland. 

                                                               Stein  imagines  that  Indian  feudalism  is  seen  by  its  exponents  only  in  the  context  of  feudatories  found  everywhere  in  pre-modern  India.  Against  this,  Sharma  says  that  the  payment  of  tribute  by  the  feudatories  depends  on  its  strength,  which consequently  determines  the  extent  of  local  exploitation  of  the  peasants.  If  the  tribute  is  regular  the  peasant  would  be  taxed  more;  if  it  is  occasional  he  would be  taxed  less.  But  the  landlords,  superimposed  upon  the  peasants,  became  regular  exploiters  whose  presence  is  indispensable  to  the  control  of  the  land  and  of  the  peasants  who  cultivate  it.  The  feudal  infrastructure  explains  the  nature  of  the  state  and  all  other  superstructural   elements  such  as  art,  religion  and  culture.  Feudatories  play  but  a  supplementary  role  in  the  whole  system.  

                                                                            Stein  says,  ‘merely  structural  comparison  of  Indian  and  African  forms  gives  offence  to  many  Indians’  Against  him,   R.  S.  Sharma   says  that  Stein  ignores  the  importance  of  the  comparative  method  in  historical  studies  but  also  the  fact  that  European  history  was  has  been  taught  in  India  for  nearly  two  hundred  years;  the colonial  masters  never  introduced  any  African  history  except  that  of  Ancient  Egypt  or  Africa’s  partition  in  the  1880s.  Indian  historians  have  been  influenced  by  the  western  writings  on  European  history  but  they  have  not  been  attracted  by  such  constructs  as  the  one  on  the  segmentary  state.  R.  S. Sharma  also  further  says  that    the  supporters  of  the  ‘segmentary’  state  appear  comfortable  in  a  world  of  make-believe.  To  prove  a  theory  or  to  refute  it  depends  on  the  nature  of  the  supporting  evidence.  The  attempt  to project  the  ‘segmentary’  state  as  a  model  for  the  early  Indian  state  and  society  has  proved  to  be  abortive.  Almost  every  segment  of   the  segmentary  concept  has  been  dissected  and  dismissed.  In  the  process,  the  study  of  Indian  feudalism  has  been  enriched  both  empirically  and  conceptually.

                                                     Chattopadhaya  has  criticized  R. S.  Sharma  for  considering  the  land  grants  to  be  the  cause  of  political  fragmentation  and  the  rise  of  states.  But  Sharma  discounted  this  possibility  in  peripheral  states  as  early  as  1960.  He  stated  that  in  Orissa  the  transition  to  organized  state/class  society  took  place  in  the  post-Gupta  period  and  that  the  possibility  of  political  fragmentation  ‘from  above’  did  not  exist.   

                                                                            R. S. Sharma  criticizes  against  the Segmentary model by saying  that  Fragmentation  or  Segmentation  should  not  be  regarded  as  a  lasting  feature  of  Indian  feudalism.  According  to  Marc  Bloch,  parcellisation  of  sovereignty  is  a  trait  of  feudalism  in  the  first  or  classical  phase.  In  the  second  phase  or  in  the  phase  of  dissolution,  it  shows  centralization  and  royal  absolutism.  He  observes  this  in  the  context  of  western  Europe,  but  it  may  also  apply  to  India.  Even  under  the  absolute  rule  of  the  Mughals  the  feudal  mode  of  production  persisted  in  large  measure.  It  seems  that  the  fragmentation  of  political  authority  at  the  local  level  was  a  divide  and  rule  device  to  maintain  the  overall  authority  of  the  state  over  its  landed  beneficiaries  and  also  the  mass  of  the  peasantry  in  a  tenuous  manner.  Therefore,  segmentation  should  not  be  considered  to  be  a  permanently  disintegrating  feature.

                          CONCLUSION

After  going  through  some  of  the  debates,  I  can  conclude  that  the  Early  Medieval  Indian  Feudalism  was  characterized  by  a  class  of  landlords  and  by  a  class  of  subject  peasantry,  both  living  in  a  predominantly  agrarian  economy  marked  by  a  decline  in  trade  and  urbanism  and  by  a  drastic  reduction  in  metal  currency.  Most  of  the  power  structures  within  the  state  did  not  have  to  pay  taxes.   Indian  kings  made  land  grants  to  get  taxes  (surplus)  collected.  In  their  turn  the  grantees  collected  rents  from  their  tenant  peasants  who  could  be  evicted  and  even  subjected  to  forced  labour.  In  this  context,  the  concept  of  class  may  be  reconsidered.  The  position  may  be  located  in  the  overall  system  of  production.  Class  is  best  seen  in  the  context  of  the  unequal  distribution  of  the  surplus,  which  was  eventually  given  a  lasting  basis  by  the  unequal  distribution  of  the  means  of  production  and  strengthened  by  ideological,  ritualistic  and  judicial  factors.  The  social  structure  is  identified  by  the  nature  of  the  class  which  dominates  it.  Ecological  factors  influence  the  development  of  material  culture  but  do  not  determine  the  form  and  nature  of  the  social  structure.

                                                                                                                   

                        BIBLIOGRAPHY

INTERNET

 ASHISH KUMAR SAHU

 

 

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[11]  Sharma  R.  S.  Indian  Feudalism.  Pp.  50-3,  121-2,  243,  283;  Sharma  R.  S.  Light  on   Early  Indian  Society  and  Economy  (Bombay  1966). p.  73;  Yadava  B.  N.  S.  Society  and  culture.  pp.  163-73;  Yadava  ‘Immobility  and  Subjection’.  pp.  21-3 

[12]   Mukhia  Harbans.  The  Feudalism  Debate. pp.  253.

[13]  Ibid.  p.  254.

[14]  Mukhia  Harbans.  ‘Was  There  Feudalism   in  Indian  History ?’. The   Journal  of   Peasant  Studies,      volume  8.  April  1981.  pp.  286,  289,  303,  fn.  124.

[15]  This  was  the  case  in  north  Bihar  until  the  abolition  of   the  Permanent   Settlement. 

[16]  Ray Niharranjan,   History  of  the  Bengali  People,  p.  288

[17]  Stein  Burton,  ‘The  Segmentary  State’

[18]  Ibid.

[19]  Chattopadhyaya  B.  D.  The  Making  of  Early  Medieval  India,  New  Delhi,  Oxford  University 

Press,  1994.

[20]  Sharma  R.  S.  ‘Land  System  in  Medieval  Orissa  (c.  750-1200)’,  Proceedings  of  the  Indian  History  Congress,  (PIHC),  Aligarh  Session,  1960,  pp.  89-96.

IQTA SYSTEM (ADMINISTRATION UNDER THE SULTANATE)

ADMINISTRATION UNDER THE SULTANATE
IQTA SYSTEM

                      The iqtadari was a unique type of land distribution and administrative system evolved during the Sultanate per~od. Under the system, the whole empire was divided into several large and small tracts of land, called the iqtas, which were assigned to nobles, officers and soldiers for the purpose of administration and revenue collection. The iqtas were transferable, i.e., the holders of iqtas-iqtadars-were transferred from one region to an­other every three to four years. It means that the grant of iqta did not imply a right to the land. It was just an administrative unit.
The iqtas could be big (whole province) or small. The assignees of bigger iqtas-known as muqti or lOali-had dual obligation, tax collection and administration. They collected revenue from their iqta, defrayed their own expenses, paid the troops maintained by them and sent the bawazil (sur­plus) to the Centre. Their accounts were checked by the royal auditors of the dilOan-i-lOizarat                                 ..

The holders of small iqtas were individual troopers. They had no administrative responsibilities. They appropri­ated, for their personal use, the land revenue collected by them. In return, when the central government called them for service or inspection, they had to be present with horses and arms. Muhammad of Ghur was the first to introduce the iqta system in India, but it was lltutrnish who gave it an institutional form. The iqtadari system witnessed numerous changes during the Sultanate period. Initially, iqta was a revenue-yielding piece of land which was assigned in lieu of salary. However, during Firuz Shah Tughlaq's reign, it became hereditary. The government of the Delhi sultans was a theocracy in the sense that the ruler was subject to the Shariat, the Islamic law. The sultans were head of state, not religion, but their duty was to observe the Shariat in matters of state. The Sultan was an autocrat and his will was law, though he considered himself the deputy of the Khalifa. The Sultans of Delhi did not follow any law of succession. The choice of the sultan depended largely on the decisions of nobles. The organisation of the government was feudal in character. The provinces were mostly military fiefs entrusted to the charge of nobles.   
                               The sultan was the chief law-giver and the final court of appeal. He was also the commander-in-chief of the military forces. He had a council of trusted advisers, called majlis-i-khaiwat which he consulted on important occasions but he was not bound to accept its decision. The business of the government was organised in several departments.
                                                The lOazir was the chief minister of the state. He was in charge of revenue and finance, and controlled the other departments. l-Jis office was known as the dilOan-i-lOazarat. The next important department was diwan-i-arz headed by ariz-i-mumalik, who was responsible for the recruitment, payment and inspection of troops. The diwan-i-insha headed by dahir-i-mumalik managed the royal correspondence. Religious matters and endowments were dealt with by the diwan-i-rasalat headed by sadr-us sudur. (But Dr. Habibullah holds that this official managed foreign affairs, and received and sent envoys.) The sadr-us-sudur enforced the Islamic rules and regulations, and supervised charity and pious foundations. In the 13th century, the Delhi Sultanate was divided into a number of military regions, called iqtas. The provinces were also called iqtas. Each province was under a mukti or lOali. During the reign of Ala-ud-din Khalji, three types of provinces existed. Muktis or lOalis were responsible for law and order and collection of taxes in their iqtas or provinces. They were also responsible for implementing the decision of the courts, providing encouragement to trade and com­merce, and managing judicial administration                     ..During the Sultanate period, many officials were re­cruited in the provinces for collecting revenue. These officials included nazir and lOakuf. Besides, sahib-i-diwan or khlOaja maintained accounts of the provinces and sent them to the central administration  Each province was divided into a number of shiqs which were under the officials called shiqdars. The shiqdar was responsible for maintaining law and order in their areas. There was also an official called katwal at the shiq level. The demarcation of duties between shiqdars and katwais is not very clear.
Each shiq was divided into a number of parganas, groups of hundred villages. The chaudhari was the head of a pargana. A m1'shrif was in charge of accounts and revenue at the pargana level. The village was the smallest unit of administration. The functioning and administration remained basically the same as it had existed during the pre-Turkish phase. Khat, muqaddam and patwari were the main village functionaries.

Mohammad Ghori

The conquest of Mohammad Ghori and establishment of the Sultanate brought major changes in the land revenue system in India. The Governments in those times made all attempts to increase the revenue by collecting taxes as per those in Islamic nations. The new taxes were imposed upon people and government’s share in produce increased. However, till that time, the original form of Hindu system of Land tenure as per ancient Manu’s laws survived with some modifications done by some of the greedy sultans and their officials.

The agricultural and land revenue system of the early Turkish Sultans rested on two foundations viz. the Iqta (assignment of land revenue) and Kharaj (Land Revenue).

The Iqta system provided an agrarian system to the country while the members of the ruling class attained income without any permanent attachment to any territory. The Iqta system was provided institutional status by Iltutmish and later this system became the mainstay of the sultanate administration under slave dynasty

Iqta System

Under Iqta System, the land of the empire was divided into several large and small tracts called Iqta and assigned these Iqtas to his soldiers, officers and nobles. In the beginning, an Iqta was based upon salary. Later, under Firoz Shah Tughlaq it became hereditary.

Literally, Iqta means land or land revenue assigned to an individual on certain conditions. The holders of these Iqtas were the trustful agents of the Sultan. There were two kinds of Iqtas viz. Large Iqtas and Small Iqtas. The holders of large Iqta were the provincial governors, who had some administrative responsibilities also. On the other hand, the holders of the small Iqtas were the small troops holders who had no administrative responsibilities.

The small Iqta holders held and appropriated all the income obtained from the cultivators but as a quid pro quid, they were bound to present themselves with horses and arms whenever called upon by the Central Government. These small Iqta holders were called Khuts and Muqaddams. Amir Khusarau, for the first time, referred to Khuts as Zamindars. The Khuts and Muqaddams became fond of luxurious living over the period of time, later, Alauddin Khilji suddenly abolished the system of small Iqtas with a stroke of pen and brought them under the central Government (thus called Khalsa land). This was regarded as one of the most important agrarian reforms of Alauddin Khilji.

The Buyids reform of Iqta‘

The Buyids codified the already existent system of tax farming. They united the Amirs of Persia and reorganized their land into Iqtas, whose borders remained largely similar to the predecessor states. Contrary to most other forms of Iqta, it was hereditary, but the land was divided when there were more sons of age.

Iqta‘ in the Seljuq era[

In the Seljuk Empire, the move toward the iqta' system was facilitated by the Persian bureaucrat Nizam al-Mulk "who developed and systemized the trend towards feudalism that was already inherent in the tax-farming practices of the immediately preceding period," [2] It is made clear that muqtis hold no claim on the peasants/subjects other than that of collecting from them in a proper manner the due land tax that has been assigned to them. When the revenue has been realized from them, those subjects should remain secure from any demands of the muqtis in respect of their persons, wealth, families,lands and goods. The muqtis can't hold any further claims on them. The subjects can go to the King and address their grievances in case they are being subjugated by the muqtis. It is thus clear that the muqtis only hold the land under the king, the land in truth belongs to the Sultan. Nizam-ul-Mulk emphasizes an important element in the iqta- muqti's right to collect and appropriate taxes.[3] Of course, the muqtis also had certain obligations to the Sultan. They had to maintain the troops and furnish them at call. The revenues they got from the iqtas were meant to be resources for him to do the same. The revenue was meant for the muqti's own expenses, payment and maintenance of the troops and the rest had to be sent back to the king. The muqti was thus a tax collector and army paymaster rolled into one.

Iqta‘ in the Mamluk sultanate of Delhi

Shamsa ud-din Iltutmish established the "Iqta‘ system" based on Mohammad Gori's ideas. It was very close to the original form of Iqta' as its main function was only to collect taxes by Muqtis/Iqtedars in India. They had no other right to the subjects apart from the taxes as long as taxes were paid. The money was used to pay for the landowner's army, which could be called by the Sultan at any time, making up for a relatively quick mobilisation and highly professional soldiers. A small part of the money was to be given to the Sultan, but the percentage was usually insignificant compared to the other expenses. Iqtas were given for exceptional military service or loyalty and were, unlike the original, usually hereditary. The Iqta‘ system was later reorganized by Balban, who divided his empire into small pieces of land and opposed making Iqta hereditary. His absolutist rule concentrated on limiting the power of the estates (mainly the nobility and merchants) and securing his supreme authority as the king. He also dissolved the Council of Forty - Chahalgani, a form of sharing power between the highest nobles and the king. His rule was supported by the strengthened espionage and counter-espionage system and his personal secret police, called barids.[4] The Iqta system was revived by Firuz Shah Tughlaq of the Tughlaq dynasty, having also made the assignments hereditary to please the nobles.

Iqta‘ and feudalism

Although there are similarities between the Iqta‘ system and the common fief system practiced in the west at similar periods, there are also considerable differences.The Iqta‘ holders generally did not technically own the lands, but only assume the right to the revenue of the land, a right that the government typically reserved the right to change. Many Iqta‘ holders did not hold their Iqta' for life, and at least in most cases they were not subject to inheritance to the next generation. Although the subjects attached to the Iqta‘ were still technically free men, in real practice the end result often end up with them functioning like serfs. There are significant variances in the actual implementation of Iqta' systems throughout the different periods and in different area, so it is difficult to completely generalize them.

Factors responsible for the transition to capitalism

The increase in long-distance trade 

                                               Long-distance trade is considered to be one of the prime factors in the transition from feudalism to capitalism by economists like Paul Sweezy. Hunt counter argues that increased agricultural output and productivity provided surplus food and raw materials for handicrafts. It also led to the rapid growth of towns and freed workforce for the manufacturing sector. In due course, while reducing the wage goods constraint, the changes in the agricultural sector, freed the workforce from agriculture. The additional workforce and increased output of raw material provided a growth impetus to the industrial sector. All these were prerequisites for long distance trade                                                                                                    .
                                                           Hunt further argues in both the young as well as the matured feudal states, trade did not lead to the dissolution of the manorial system. In the young feudal states trade was subordinate to the manors and in the mature systems the signs of weakening of the feudal ties started appearing much before trade became an integral part of Western Europe. In the latter states increased agricultural output could not keep pace with the increased size of the aristocratic families which strained the relationship between feudal lords and serfs. In this situation, trade had only expedited the fall of the feudal mode of production.

                                                      Hunt (04) argued that even in the earlier part of the feudalism trade flourished in northern and southern Europe, while the rest of Europe had a feudal system. He states that the holy crusades from France were also the outcome of its internal forces. They worked as a safety valve against its domestic unrest.                                                 .

                                                         The spread of trade caused some important changes in society. First, in the medieval time period, exchange took place at the annual trade fair, where people could exchange one commodity for another. The commodities could be grain, salt, spices, brocades, gold diamonds etc. by the fifteenth century these fairs were replaced by a round-the-year market. Secondly, these new emerging cities were free from all feudal ties. Similarly, unlike the feudal artisans the new artisans severed all their ties with the agricultural activities. Thirdly, in these upcoming trade centres the new and “complex systems of currency exchange, debt clearing, and credit facilities, and modern business instruments like bills of exchange came into widespread use.”(Hunt, p.13). Fourthly, unlike the manorial customs and practices, now commercial laws started taking shape to deal with commercial crimes. At the same time  capitalist negotiation, contracts, etc. started being formalized.

In the feudal system, the artisans and craftsmen worked with their own tools and raw materials and within their own precincts. They were the masters of their product throughout the production process. They finally sold their product to the merchant. With the rapid growth of trade merchants initially started providing raw material and tools to the artisans and they were supposed to give the final product to the merchant. The artisans were still working under their own roof. Throughout the production process, the merchant was the owner of the final product. In the later stage of the putting-out system the artisans were asked work at the place provided by the merchant. This marked the beginning of the present factory system. The textile industry was the first to experiment with it. Later it spread to all the other sectors. The putting out system brought about two important changesPutting-out system and the birth of the capitalist industry

1. It created a labour force which had little or no capital.
2. The labour had only his labour power to sell.
   Both the characteristics became the salient features of the capitalist system.

Decline of the manorial system 

                                                             Increased agricultural production initially encouraged the growth of trade and commerce. Later it led to the decline of the manorial system. The feudal lords started depending more on cities for their demand of luxury items. They needed money for the purpose. To meet their need for money they started renting their land to peasants in exchange for money rent. In this process they simply became the landlords and in most of the cases absentee landlords.
 
                                                                  Peasants, on the other hand, found it profitable to sell their grain in the market for money and use this money to commute their labour services. This way they were free from all ties to the manor. They were free to sell their surplus in the market and pay the rent to the feudal lord. All these changes led to weakening of feudal ties.

                                                                The dissolution of manorial system was further aggravated by disasters of the fourteen and the fifteen centuries. The hundred-year war between France and England (1337-1453) caused unrest in these two countries. Next, the bubonic plague of the 1350s reduced the English population by half. As we know, any disaster affects the poor more. The nobility tried to overcome labour scarcity by revoking the commutation of labour services. But all their attempts to revive the feudal ties were in vain. In some cases, peasants even resorted to violent revolts.

Creation of the Working Class                                                                                 .
                                                             The dissolution of the manorial system and changes in the economy in the sixteenth century created a class which owned no means of production and were forced to sell their labour power to the owners of the means of production for wages. Only with these wages could they buy necessities                               .
                                                                  The peasants used to collect food, fuel and fodder from the village common land. By the thirteenth century the feudal lord started enclosing this land to meet the increased need for money. They used this land for grazing sheep. As a result the village people were denied access to this land. They moved to cities  in search of jobs. Cities became a haven for these rootless people. Guilds in cities have started concentrating on the material well-being of their members. The unemployed started concentrating in the urban centres. There was strict punishment against unlawful farming and begging. These inimical situations created a working class.

Other forces in the transition to Capitalism                                          .
                                                                                             The discovery of some navigation devices (compass and telescope) helped in the transport of heavy precious metals and later in colonization

                         In the medieval times (1300-1500) money mainly consisted of gold and silver coins but the production of precious metals stagnated in Europe, causing a problem in transactions. The shortage eased when gold from the Americas travelled to Europe in the sixteenth century.

                       Europe experienced very high inflation during sixteenth century to the tune of 150-300%, depending on the region. The price rise was more for the manufacturing sector than for agriculture and wages. As a result farmers and wage earners suffered more capitalists. With higher profit, the capital stock of the merchants  rose which, in due course, was reinvested and led to more capital. This way the process of capital accumulation progressed. The capitalist class earns profit from its capital stock and more capital means higher profit in the future.

This period is also marked by the appearance of nation states. The monarchs needed support from the emerging capitalist class to fight the war with the feudal lords. Capitalists provided resources to monarch to fight wars and in return the monarch promised them military support and freedom from various rules and regulations of the manorial control. In addition a system of uniform weights and measures was introduced.

                      The initial phase of capitalism is known as mercantilism. Mercantilism originated simultaneously with scarcity of gold and silver in Europe. Mercantilist policies attempted to keep the gold and silver within the country and discouraged its outflow. Spain which experienced maximum gold and silver flow from Americas imposed various restrictions on its outflow. It even announced death penalty for illegal exporters. But, to meet the requirement of trade, the merchant class managed to smuggle it out by bribing the government officials.

The government adopted various other measures to encourage the inflow of gold and silver. First, the domestic shipping and insurance agencies were promoted both for exports and imports over the foreign counterparts. Second, the government encouraged domestic monopoly because a single seller could have more control over price in the international market than if there were more than one domestic seller. In order to control foreign competition it even went ahead with the colonization of economic important regions. The export of raw material was also prohibited.

Imports to the European countries, especially England, were restricted. If an industry was unable to withstand the foreign competition then the government provided various types of support and subsidies to overcome the setback.

In the opinion of Hunt (04), the resources necessary for capitalism could have been generated from trade and commerce, the putting-out system and the enclosure movement.

Professor Irfan Habib (95) contends that inner forces of feudalism could not have given birth to capitalism. He argues that the exploitation and subjugation of other countries was essential for the emergence of capitalism in England and Western Europe. He discusses the nature of the economy in the period between the dissolution of feudalism and the emergence of capitalism (period between 1400 and later half of the eighteen century) and critically analyses whether that system could change into capitalism.

During the transition period, the rent earning landlord class was still the dominant class. A small sector of commodity production also existed in this period. Dobb and other economists have called this as “petty mode of production period”. In this mode of production with artisans and peasants, who had turned into small capitalists, even with hired labour could not have changed this mode of production to capitalism. Prof. Habib suggests that the petty mode of production could have intensified landlord coercion and extension of merchant capital at the cost of small producer’s capital. This would only have delayed the onset of capitalism.

Capitalism requires labourers who could be hired and fired by the employers, and factories using machines. Machine-based division of labour is different from that in the previous modes of production. Factories dependent on machines became a dominant form of production in England by the early eighteenth century.

As Prof. Habib argues, even technological development could not have generated enough resources for the capitalist system. He suggests that the resources required for the growth of the capitalist system could only be made available from the primitive accumulation involving internal exploitation or control over other economies, for example, colonization.